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NOTE
Health Professionals' Access to Hospitals: A
Retrospective and Prospective Analysis
I.

INTRODUCTION

The professional interdependence of the hospital institution
and practicing physicians is a phenomenon of post-World War II
society. This Note first examines the historical development of
that interdependence and explores its erosion into a hospital-dominant mode. Next it examines the most important forces that influence and complicate the question of hospital privileges for the physician within the modern hospital: the interrelated pressures of
intraprofessional restraints, pertinent government regulation, and
medical technology. Then it sketches the internal procedures that
have engendered and defined the relationship between physician
and hospital, with special attention to the weaknesses within the
procedures that have led to past litigation. Finally, this Note looks
closely at significant emergent legal challenges in the area of the
medical professional's hospital privileges and examines the health
policy implications of the available alternatives. The Note concludes that the historical balance of power that has defined hospital access has been displaced. It proposes a diversification of institutional providers and a utilization of the newly-available
autonomous health professionals.

II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The symbiotic relationship between hospitals and physicians
is the third major stage of their joint history. The first stage began
in the mid-nineteenth century and lasted for approximately fifty
years.1 During that period wealthy individuals supported hospitals
1. See generally H. SIGERIST, An Outline of the Development of the Hospital, in
HENRY E. SIGERIST ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF MEDICINE 319 (M. Roemer ed. 1960); A. SOMERS,
HEALTH CARE IN TRANSITION: DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 27-38 (1971); Mechanic, The

Changing Structure of Medical Practice, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 707, 708 (1967);
Saward, Institutional Organization,Incentives, and Change, in DOING BETrER AND FEELNG
WORSE: HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 193 (J. Knowles ed. 1977); Vogel, The Transforma-
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for the benefit of the indigent, insane, and criminal dependents of
society, as well as for the protection of the middle and upper
classes 2 from the medical and moral contagion of those "socially
unfit" individuals.3 Although a clear division arose in Europe between "generalists" and hospital-based "specialists, 4 such specialization was neither feasible nor desirable in the professionally underserved and sparsely populated United States.5 There were few
hospitals, and only about twenty percent of physicians engaged in
any hospital practice. The services rendered hospital patients by
those few physicians were gratuitous. Hospital attendance, however, did expose the doctor to medical experience that enriched his
professional knowledge and status and consequently enhanced the
successful care and treatment he could offer to his private, paying
patients. Thus, personal and professional advantage accompanied
the performing of a benevolent and charitable duty.8
With the advent of asepsis and effective anesthesia at the
close of the last century, medicine began to be more science than
art.7 Physicians could attempt more delicate and successful surgical procedures, and the era of predominantly home-based medical
care began to draw to a close8 since aseptic procedure was practically possible only in a hospital; "kitchen-table surgery" was on its
way out.' As scientific knowledge expanded and as increasing urbanization isolated individuals from families that could care for
them during medical crises, 10 the doctors serving traditional hospital populations gained the right to admit their private patients to
tion of the American Hospital, 1850-1920, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL
HIsToRY 105 (J. Reverby & D. Rosner eds. 1979).
2. Vogel, supra note 1, at 106.
3. Id. at 107-08.
4. Mechanic, supra note 1, at 708.
5. See id.
6. Vogel, supra note 1, at 109-10.
7. Saward, supra note 1, at 193.
8. Vogel, supra note 1, at 109-10. The great number of doctors who did not utilize
hospital facilities viewed with alarm the increased dependence upon hospitals. As Vogel
notes,
By 1909 the Boston Medical Society was complaining about the "rising feeling" that
surgery could be performed only in hospitals, "thus depriving all ordinary private physicians and surgeons of a class of cases." The [medical] society condemned the city's
hospitals for "inculcating in the minds of the laity a lack of confidence in the abilities
of the ordinary private practitioners."

9. Id. at 112.
10. Id. at 110-12.
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the hospital when necessary.1 1 This privilege of admission became
the dominant pattern and has remained so, albeit for different
12
reasons.
The relationship between doctor and hospital entered its second stage in the first part of the twentieth century. The hospital
served as a central institution devoted to service of the public and
to the doctor's increased efficiency and convenience. It provided
the doctor with a ready-made support staff of nurses, residents,
and interns. It also bore the costs of acquiring the latest technological developments.1 8 These latter innovations in medical care provided the impetus for the transformation of the traditional charitable hospital into its modern successor. As the costs of technology
increased, wealthy patrons could no longer fund the institutions,
and the main source of income to be tapped was the patients.'
Thus, hospitals shifted toward greater economic self-maintenance,
although still relying heavily upon charitable contributions and
upon charitable immunity from taxes and liability.15
It is only slightly hyperbolic to suggest that, until the advent
of the "wonder drugs" in the late 1930s and 1940s, the doctor had
as much in common with the aboriginal witch doctor as with the
scientist. Medicine as a profession was charismatic instead of curative. The traditional image of the family doctor as an available
comforter and counselor is fairly realistic. In the first forty years of
the century, physicians could prevent some disease through vaccination, inoculation, and other public health measures.' 6 Although a
11. See Mechanic, supra note 1, at 708.
12. Id.
13. Because hospitals had always been charities administered by philanthropic lay-

men, the old guard hospital establishment viewed with alarm the innovations of "newfangled" medicine. For example, George Ludlam, lay superintendent of New York Hospital and
president of the American Hospital Association in 1906, deplored the difficulty of working
with doctors trained in the scientific method: "Familiarity with these methods engenders a

spirit of extravagance which permeates the whole establishment and which is exceedingly
difficult to check or control." Quoted in Vogel, supra note 1, at 113. Massachusetts General

Hospital, epitomizing the confrontation between the old charity hospital and the new scientific institution, asked the visiting staff to restrict the use of oxygen. Id. at 114.
14. Id.
15. Charitable immunity is an exception to general tort liability based upon the need
to encourage and protect charitable institutions which shoulder economic and social burdens
that would otherwise be borne by the government. The majority of American jurisdictions

consistently recognized the immunity until 1942, when the District of Columbia abolished
the doctrine. See President & Dirs. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C.
Cir. 1942). Subsequently, more than half of the states have abolished the immunity. W.
PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS 996 & n.68 (4th ed. 1971).
16. "[T]herapeutic intervention was of only limited efficacy; much of medical practice
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few diseases could be medically treated, most "cures" were effected
surgically-still limited, however, by the threat of uncontrolled
postoperative infection.
The discovery and use of antibiotics largely eliminated such
threats. Science could not only prevent disease, but also control
and even cure it. Federal and private monies began to pour into
medical research. 17 The Hill-Burton Act' 8 resulted in the building
of hundreds of small hospitals with fewer than fifty beds in the
postwar years.19
This explosion of hospitals helped fuel the trend toward specialization.20 In 1940 the proportion of general practitioners to
medical specialists was over three to one.21 Thirty years later specialists exceeded general practitioners four to one.22 Such a dramatic reversal evidences the third major stage in the hospital-physician relationship: that of the hospital-dependent physician.
Open recognition of the hospital's power was the underlying
basis for the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital.23 In Darling a physician on call in the hospital's emergency room applied a cast to
plaintiff's broken leg. Afterwards, plaintiff complained of severe
pain and observed that his toes were "swollen and dark."24 Two
days later there was evidence of necrosis, but the physician did not
institute an effective treatment. Approximately two weeks after his
admission to the hospital, plaintiff was transferred to another hosconsisted of environmental manipulation." Vogel, supra note 1, at 106.
17. R. RUSHMER, NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR HEALTH: PAST, PRESENT, AND PROJECTED 1239 (1980). Rushmer traces the postwar emphasis on health care to the finding that 30% of
draftees were rejected during World War II for health deficiencies and to the belief that
medical problems could be controlled in. much the same way that the Axis powers had been
controlled, through "[c]ontinued collaboration between government and the private sector."
Id. at 12.
18. Hospital Survey and Construction Act (Hill-Burton Act), ch. 958, 60 Stat. 1040
(1946) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The Hill-Burton
Act added Title VI to the Public Health Service Act, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (1944).
19. Saward, supra note 1, at 195.
20. For a detailed discussion of the various factors in the trend toward specialization,
see E. RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 204-39 (1967); Beeson,
Subspecialties,93 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 624 (1980);

The Natural History of Medical
Strosberg, GraduateMedical Edu-

cation, Specialists, and Specialization-The Tangled Web, 4 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.
559 (1980).
21. E. RAYACK, supra note 20, at 204.
22. M. ROEMER, COMPARATIVE NATIONAL POLICIES ON HEALTH CARE 60 (1977).
23. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
24. Id. at 328, 211 N.E.2d at 255.
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pital where other physicians amputated the lower part of his leg.
Plaintiff brought suit against both the original physician and the
hospital for negligence but settled with the physician before trial.
At trial a jury found for plaintiff against defendant hospital and
awarded plaintiff $110,000. The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the verdict.
The court rejected the hospital's argument that it was protected under a traditional charitable immunity doctrine, 5 and it
prospectively abolished the rule limiting liability to the "amount of
liability insurance that [charitable corporations] see fit to carry, [a
limitation that] permits [such corporations] to determine whether
or not they will be liable for their torts and the amount of that
liability, if any., 28 The court cited with approval an earlier New
York case 27 that described the nature of the modern hospital:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient,
does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer
reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly
demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and internes,
as well as administrative and manual workers, and they charge patients for
medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal
action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of "hospital facilities" expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not
28 that its nurses or other
employes [sic] will act on their own responsibility.

Although two other jurisdictions had previously acknowledged
hospital liability,29 the Darling case is generally recognized as the
landmark decision delineating the character of the modern hospital. No longer simply the "doctor's indispensable workshop, the
hospital is also the principal center for development of quality
measurements and controls. Its complex of internal and external
audits and standards constitutes the nation's primary protection
against unqualified or inappropriate medical practice."3 0
Recognition of a hospital's liability for quality of care to some
extent displaced the traditional freedom of a physician to determine his own methods of patient care and affected the individual
25.
26.
27.
28.
(1957)).
29.
Thunig,
30.

Id. at 337, 211 N.E.2d at 260.
Id.
Id. at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
Id. (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11
See Goff v. Doctors Gen. Hosp., 166 Cal. App. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 29 (1958); Bing v.
2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
A. SOMERS, supra note 1, at 27.
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physician's ease of access to hospital privileges. Until Darling both
the quality of staff privileges extended to an individual physician
and the complexity of procedures attempted by him often bore
only a tenuous relationship to either an objective measure of the
physician's competence or to the length and rigor of his training."1
Rather, physicians made individual determinations concerning
32
their own competence to undertake various medical procedures.
This entrepreneurial exuberance was contained only by the individual judgment of a physician and by the legal restraint imposed
by malpractice liability. In response to Darling,however, hospitals
undertook to safeguard themselves against liability, by adopting
guidelines and regulations for different kinds and degrees of staff
privileges. This represents a significant displacement of former
strict intraprofessional regulation by physicians, since the guidelines and regulations mark a shift in emphasis toward protection of
the hospital institution and away from the earlier freedom of access by almost any licensed physician. Significantly, this erosion
of the "third stage" of the hospital-physician relationship may signal the beginning of an historical "fourth stage" marked by an increasing dominance of the physician by the hospital.
III. FORCES AFFECTING THE PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL RELATIONSHIP
A variety of forces have contributed to the development of a
symbiotic relationship between the hospital and the physician and
to the rise of the hospital as the monolithic structure with which
all health care providers must be affiliated in order to achieve legitimacy. This section of the Note examines several of the major
forces affecting physicians' access to hospitals.
A.

IntraprofessionalRestraints

The medical profession has been internally regulated during
most of its history. 4 The surgeon's guild followed the pattern of
other craft guilds, with a rigid, prolonged apprenticeship that advanced the surgeon-craftsman from apprentice to journeyman to
master. 5 The physician, however, was considered an academic and
31. See Mechanic, supra note 1, at 708.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. H. SIGERIST, supra note 1, at 308-18.
35. Id. at 311-12. To obtain the highest position, the surgeon was given a stringent
examination by master-surgeons and sometimes by physicians. Id.
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thus was not qualified to be a member of a guild.3 6 The medical
faculty of the university where he trained controlled the physician's entry into the profession. 7 If the physician wanted to move,
he was required to present his credentials and recommendations to
the medical faculty of his desired residence in order to receive the
privilege to practice there.3
The American Medical Association (AMA)3 9 is the modern
counterpart of the guild or academic faculty and is synonymous
with the medical establishment. The AMA's ethically-based desire
to raise the quality of medicine coupled with its economicallybased desire to restrict competition has, until very recently, exacerbated the chronic medical manpower shortage in American society.4 0 The AMA's control over the supply of both physicians and
hospitals, and over the quality of health care delivered, has affected the physician's ability to gain hospital access;"1 it has also
36. Id. at 312.
37. The first medical school in western Europe (at Salerno) issued the following order
in 1140 under the aegis of the Norman king, Roger:
Who, from now on, wishes to practice medicine, has to present himself before our
officials and examiners, in order to pass their judgment. Should he be bold enough to
disregard this, he will be punished by imprisonment and confiscation of his entire
property. In this way we are taking care that our subjects are not endangered by the
inexperience of the physicians.
Nobody dare practice medicine unless he has been found fit by the convention of
the Salernitan masters.
Id.
38. Id. at 313-14.
39. The AMA's stated objective since its inception in 1847 has been the maintenance
of a high quality of medical practice. Its primary objective during the last half of the nineteenth century was to ensure uniform standards through governmental licensing of all physicians. State medical societies, which are official offshoots of the AMA, control state as well
as national health policy through lobbying and legislative proposals. Even though county
medical societies are voluntary organizations, the state societies delegate rulemaking authority to the county societies. The latter are "crucial to a doctor because exclusion or expulsion
gives rise to an adverse inference concerning professional fitness. Also, membership in a
county society is often a prerequisite for eligibility for hospital staff privileges or membership in a specialty organization." Note, Application of the Antitrust Laws to Anticompetitive Activities by Physicians, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 991, 999 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
40. See E. RAYACK, supra note 20, at 66-81, 94-101, 107-30; Blackstone, The A.M.A.
and the Osteopaths:A Study of the Power of Organized Medicine, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 405,
406-07 (1977). The medical manpower shortage may be alleviated within the next ten years,

and, indeed, a surplus is predicted by 1990. See
COMMITTEE, SUMMARY REPORT,

1

GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION ADVISORY

REPORT OF THE GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION ADVISORY

COMMITTEE TO THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

(September 1980) [hereinafter cited as GMENAC

4 fig. 1, 23

SUMMARY REPORT].

41. See Blackstone, supra note 40, at 406. But see Hall & Lindsay, Medical Schools:
Producers of What? Sellers to Whom?, J.L. & ECON. 55 (1980), for an argument that the
AMA has less influence on physician supply than has the normal market mechanism of
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raised the specter of monopoly.
In 1904 the AMA created its Council on Medical Education,
whose initial task was to inspect the nation's 161 medical schools.
the Council found approximately one-half to be
Of these schools,
"acceptable. '42 The council's groundwork led to the Flexner Report, issued in 1910.43 The result was the closing of substandard
in the number of medimedical schools and a two-fifths reduction
4
cal school graduates from 1904 to 1920.
The more far-reaching effect of the establishment of the Council on Medical Education has been the AMA's power to accredit
medical schools through the Council. The AMA soon began to condition state licensing of physicians-a prerequisite to medical practice-upon graduation from an AMA-accredited school. 5 Later, internship became a further requirement for licensure in most states,
and the Council extended its duties to accreditation of internship
programs. 46 Because hospitals needed interns4 7 in order to attract
other physicians to their staffs, the AMA thus wielded a powerful
weapon. Unaccredited hospitals could not attract doctors; doctors
could not practice medicine if they graduated from unaccredited
Thus,
medical schools or if they served unaccredited internships.
48
indirectly.
albeit
hospitals,
to
access
controlled
AMA
the
Organized medicine has also had a profound impact upon the
supply of physicians, which has a direct effect upon hospital access. If the number of physicians is restricted, more of the available physicians will be likely to gain hospital privileges. If the
number of physicians increases, there will be, assuming a relatively
constant number of staff positions, more doctors than existing hossupply and demand.
42. See E. RAYACK, supra note 20, at 66.
43. Id. at 67. Abraham Flexner, a prominent medical educator in the early twentieth
century, surveyed all medical schools in the United States and Canada for the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. He published his findings as MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA in 1910. During the following decade, he assisted in
the reorganization of the medical schools and the establishment of higher standards for
medical education.
44. Even such a determined critic of organized medicine as Rayack can find no monopolistic intent by the AMA at that time, but rather a "socially justifiable desire to raise
the deplorably low standards of medical training existing at the turn of the century." E.
RAYACK, supra note 20, at 69-70.
45. See Blackstone, supra note 40, at 406.
46. Id. See also F. WILsoN & D. NEUHAUSER, HEALTH SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES
66 (rev. & enlarged 1st ed. 1976).
47. Until the mid-1960s, interns provided an extremely cheap labor source. See Blackstone, supra note 40, at 406.
48. Id.
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pitals can accommodate. A good historical example of supply control took place during the economic depression of the 1930s, when
physicians' incomes fell approximately forty percent between 1929
and 1932. 4 1 The medical hierarchy responded by calling for "professional birth control. ' 50 In the next seven years, medical schools
accepted eighteen percent fewer students.5 1 Except for the war
years, 1941-1945, the low acceptance rate continued until very recently when governmental pressure led to an increased number of
physicians. The effect of the medical hierarchy's restriction on the
supply of physicians, coupled with the historical patterns of hospital privileges and an increase in hospital facilities, has been an ease
of admission to a hospital staff. In recent years, however, countervailing hospital policies and overriding governmental regulation
have reduced the singular importance of intraprofessional
restraints.
B.

Government Regulation: Licensing

A second significant influence on the ability of physicians to
gain hospital access is the increasing role of the government in
health care since World War II. Related to this intervention is a
changing perception of health care from that of a group of related
professions to that of a health "industry" requiring control and
regulation. 2 The oldest form of governmental regulation of
medicine is professional licensure, universally regarded as a valid
exercise of the state police power.53 The primary policy objective
behind the process of licensing individual medical professionals
and institutions is to insure public protection by establishing minimal standards of quality and integrity.5 4 The primary problems
49.
50.

See E. RAYACK, supra note 20, at 73.
Editorial,99 J.A.M.A. 765 (1932), quoted in E.

51. See E.
52.

RAYACK,

RAYACK,

supra note 20, at 74.

supra note 20, at 78; Blackstone, supra note 40, at 406-07.

COMMISSION ON THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE

MARKETPLACE, 1 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE

(1976-77) 28 (AMA, 1978).
53. See, e.g., McCoy v. Commonwealth Bd. of Med. Educ. & Licensure, 37 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 530, 391 A.2d 723 (1978) (State has the right under the police power to regulate
professions so long as the matter regulated affects the public interest).
54. Forgotson & Cook, Innovations and Experiments in Uses of Health Manpower-The Effect of the Licensing Laws, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 731, 733 (1967);
Vladeck, The Design of Failure:Health Policy and the Structure of Federalism, 4 J. OF
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 522, 528 (1979). See generally Carlson, Health Manpower Licensing and Emerging InstitutionalResponsibility for the Quality of Care, 35 LAw & CoNTMP.
PROS. 849 (1970).
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arising from licensure are the preservation of the "status quo" 55
and the low quality endorsed by the statutes." Moreover, in a time
of increasing federal regulation of the health care industry, the
lack of licensing uniformity among the various states often necessitates expensive adaptive procedures or results in a failure to imple57
ment the various federally-funded programs.
Licensing laws often have been the sine qua non of hospital
staff privileges: if one is not a licensed medical doctor, staff privileges are not available. Moreover, in contrast to the broad grant of
discretion afforded medical doctors by the licensing laws, the state
has restricted sharply the scope of licenses granted to other health
professionals. Nurses, 58 midwives,5 9 and, until recently, osteopaths,60 have had limited licenses granted by the state. For these
professionals the permitted practices are often unduly restrictive,
or without reference to the realities of technical innovation or to
the expanding scope of expertise possessed by them. As these other
medical professionals become increasingly competitive with doctors, pressure grows to increase the scope of their licensed practices. One result is that the physicians' stranglehold on hospital
privileges is slowly eroding."1
C. Internal Procedures and Grounds for Exclusion
Recent developments in the hospital staff privilege system
have brought about important changes in physician-hospital rela55.

Forgotson & Cook, supra note 54, at 736. Forgotson and Cook point out that the

licensure system alone is an insufficient regulatory device because once a physician is licensed, his position in the profession is virtually unchallengeable since the system is unable
to effectively monitor his competence during the course of his career. Id. at 733.
56. Since the original enactment of most occupational licensure acts in substantially
their present form shortly after the beginning of the twentieth century, vast social and
scientific changes have taken place. Even though the substrate upon which licensure
laws must act has changed, creating new problems and increased demand for health
services, there have been no fundamental changes in licensure laws ....
Id. at 734.
57. Vladeck, supra note 54, at 528.
58. See, e.g., TENN.CODE ANN. §§ 63-743, -748, -760 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
59. Almost all states now permit the practice of midwifery. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 429.70-.90 (West Supp. 1979).
60.

See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-904 to -905 (1976) (no limitation on practice of

osteopathic medicine). See generally Bloom, The DOs' Growing Pains, MED. WORLD NEws,
October 27, 1980, at 42. An osteopath practices osteopathy, a system of therapeutics based
upon the theory that diseases are due chiefly to mechanical derangement, especially displacement of bones. See text accompanying note 147 infra.
61. See Part IV infra.
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tions. 2 This section of the Note concentrates on the internal procedures by which hospitals add and maintain physicians on their
staffs and on the bases for disallowing or discontinuing hospital
privileges.
There is a new recognition that the hospital-reliant physician
and the liability-shy hospital have potentially divergent interests-the physician being interested in maximizing his professional

growth and livelihood through hospital affiliation, and the hospital
being concerned with ensuring quality care to patients and shielding itself from liability and promoting its services in a competitive
market. Thus, hospital staff privileges have value as adjuncts to
governmental licensing laws 6s in promoting quality health care for
the benefit of the public.6 4 While licensure almost invariably involves a one-time imprimatur by the state, 5 the granting of staff
privileges amounts to a continual recertification 6 both by a physician's peers6 7 and by the potentially adversarial hospital board.6 8
Furthermore, since boards grant hospital privileges on an institu62. For perceptive discussions of hospital staff privileges for physicians, see Kessenick
& Peer, Physicians' Access to the Hospital: An Overview, 14 U.S.F. L. REv. 43 (1979); Ludlarn, Physician-HospitalRelations: The Role of Staff Privileges, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
879 (1970); McCall, A Hospital's Liability for Denying, Suspending and Granting Staff
Privileges, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 175 (1980). See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 645 (1971). See
also Forgotson & Cook, supra note 54, at 737-38; D. Steed, Legal Aspects of the HospitalStaff Relationship (1979) (unpublished student paper on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
63. See, e.g., Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d 1398 (1975) (hospital can set
higher standard for admission to staff privileges than possession of a state license).
64. See Forgotson & Cook, supra note 54, at 737.
65. See Ludlam, supra note 62, at 896. Note that specialty board certification is also a
"once and for all" testing procedure, although the procedure is undergoing modification
through continuing medical education (CME) requirements.
66. Staff privileges are reviewed annually or biennially in most hospitals.
67. See Forgotson & Cook, supra note 54, at 737-38: "[S]ubprocesses [such] as utilization review, tissue committee review, medical audit, and professional activity surveys can be
incorporated into the over-all process of supervision of staff privileges." See also Ludlam,
supra note 62, at 896.
68. Although we start from the premise that the hospital's governing board has the
ultimate responsibility for medical staff appointments and privileges, we must also assume that such a board made up of lay persons is not qualified to actually process an
application involving issues of professional competency. Traditionally, the medical staff
has been treated as being self-governing in that it actually does all the work on the
applications, and, except in very extraordinary circumstances, its recommendations are
routinely approved by the governing board. Furthermore, the medical staff is exceedingly jealous of its prerogatives in this regard and should not be reversed except in
extraordinary circumstances.
Ludlam, supra note 62, at 897. See also JOINT COMMISSION ON AccREnrrATiON OF HoSPITALS,
Medical Staff, AcCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 93 (1981 ed.) [hereinafter cited as
ACCREDITATION MANUAL]. But see Dimieri & Weiner, The Public Interest and Governing
Boards of Nonprofit Health Care Institutions, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1029 (1981).
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tion-by-institution basis, the procedure for evaluation is flexible
and fairly expeditious. Difficulties too small for the governmental
licensure mesh can be addressed and corrected efficiently on this
parochial level. Similarly, the less formal and rigorous procedural
standards of the hospital's evaluation processes result in a more
efficient disposition of troublesome matters than is possible in the
context of "quasi-penal" licensure violations.6 9
The "policing" mechanism of the hospital privilege system can
deal with perceived "internal" problems such as ordinary incompetence in the performance of professional duties. The system can
also restrict the breadth of a physician's activities if he lacks necessary skills, or it can suggest corrective measures if his educational
or professional skills are obsolete or completely lacking. Finally,
the hospital privilege system can deal effectively with skill diminution or incompetence resulting from age, illness, drug or alcohol
abuse, and personality disorders.70
The hospital privilege system also has inherent weaknesses.
Foremost is the hesitation of the errant physician's peers to discipline him. At the same time, however, physicians are reluctant to
allow the integrity of the profession to be diminished by the errant
physician.7 1 Furthermore, the hesitancy to discipline is increasingly
69. See JoINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, MODEL BYLAWS (1977)
[hereinafter cited as JCAH MODEL BYLAWS].
70. See Forgotson & Cook, supra note 54, at 737-38. The latest Hill-Burton regulations may severely undercut the advantages of the hospital privilege system. The original
purpose of the Hill-Burton community service regulation was to prohibit racial discrimination and to prevent a "monopoly of government-funded hospitals by special interests."
Note, The Hill-Burton Act, 1946-1980: Asynchrony in the Delivery of Health Care to the
Poor, 39 MD. L. REv. 316, 366 (1979). Under the latest revision of this regulation, 42 C.F.R.
§§ 124.601-.607 (1979), this purpose has apparently been transformed to achieve the goal of
complete access to hospital facilities and services by indigents (Medicaid recipients and
others). The receipt of Hill-Burton funds by a hospital facility places the burden of indigent
care upon that facility. See Note, supra at 366-67. While this regulation would seriously
impair a hospital's efforts to contain costs, it would also demolish the rationale for hospital
privileges. Under 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(d)(1), in order to comply with the community service
regulation, a hospital cannot refuse admission to a person on the grounds that a physician
with staff privileges at the particular hospital did not refer him.
One suggestion for assuring compliance is to "authoriz[e] the individual's physician, if
licensed and otherwise qualified, to treat the patient at the facility even though the physician does not have staff privileges at the facility." 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(d)(1)(i) (1979). Since
"otherwise qualified" remains undefined, disruption of hospital privilege procedure can only
follow. This provision is in direct conflict with the accreditation and licensure requirements
of most hospitals. In addition, the requirement increases the likelihood of hospital liability
for the acts of physicians but without the guarantee of professional ability that the hospital
privileges procedure affords. See also American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 134244 (7th Cir. 1980) (Pell, J., dissenting in part).
71. [T]he most important role of a medical staff is to improve the quality of prac-
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counterbalanced by the hospital's necessity to shield itself from liability, 5 and by the existence of the Professional Standards Re-

view Organizations (PSROs). a
A second problem concerns the ineffectiveness of staff privilege sanctions imposed on the incompetent or unstable physician
who practices outside the hospital.7 4 Unless his conduct is egregious, the "slightly" incompetent, unethical, or unstable physician
may continue to practice free from licensing or other legal restraints but to the probable detriment of his patients' health.
Each hospital is a self-contained unit and "[c]linical privileges
are hospital-specific. Thus, an individual may be a member of
more than one hospital staff, yet have different practice privileges
in each hospital. The possession of adequate professional qualifications based on training and experience does not in itself assure the
granting of specific privileges. 75 Because of the potential for physician-hospital difficulties that may threaten the stability of the institution, staff membership is often predicated upon an agreement
between the staff member and the hospital that the former will be
"bound by the medical staff bylaws and the current hospital policies that apply to his activities as a medical staff member and that
are consistent with the medical staff bylaws." 76 The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) mandates that medical
staff bylaws include established procedures by which to resolve
problems. The JCAH promulgated model bylaws in 1971 to aid
tice of each individual physician, while the need to punish, by limiting or denying privileges, represents an ultimate failure for an individual, and perhaps for the entire staff
system. The medical staff must assure itself that it has done everything reasonable to
save the man before such steps are taken. Obviously, it cannot jeopardize the welfare of
its own patients, but turning him out the door to commit the same errors on another
group of patients in a new setting is not an adequate solution to the problem.
Ludlam, supra note 62, at 897.
72. See Goff v. Doctors' Gen. Hosp., 166 Cal. App. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 29 (1958); Darling
v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 11. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 166 N.Y.S.2d 3
(1957).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (1976). The 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act established the PSROs, which implemented a procedure for peer review aimed at promoting cost
consciousness and assuring maintenance of quality in medical care. In essence, PSRO organizations in discrete geographical areas review the care provided to recipients of federal aid
under Medicare and Medicaid. Funds for payment of such services are not disbursed to
health care providers if the PSRO disapproves the care. See Blumstein, Inflation and Quality: The Case of PSROs, in HEALTH: A Vicm OR CAUSe OF INFLATION? 245 (M. Zubkoff ed.
1976).
74. See note 71 supra.
75. AcCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 68, at 96.
76. Id. at 93.
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hospitals seeking to comply with its regulations."
The status of the particular hospital-private, public, or
quasi-public-determines whether and to what extent courts will
be involved in the resolution of disputes concerning the' conferral
or denial of staff privileges.7 8 In Peterson v. Tucson General Hospital, Inc.,79 the court stated succinctly the differences among the
three categories:
The principal distinguishing feature of a private hospital is that it has the
power to manage its own affairs and is not subject to the direct control of a
governmental agency. The public hospital is an instrumentality of the state,
founded and owned in the public interest, supported by public funds, and
governed by those deriving their authority from the state. A "quasi public"
status is achieved if what otherwise would be a truly private hospital was
constructed with public funds, is presently receiving public benefits or has
been sufficiently incorporated into a governmental plan for providing hospital
facilities to the public."

As a general rule, courts refuse to review a private hospital's
action in denying staff privileges as long as the hospital complies
with its own medical bylaws 8 -since staff exclusion is within the
discretion of the hospital management 8 2-and until the plaintiff
has exhausted all internal hospital remedies.83 The only staff privilege case to reach the United States Supreme Court is Hayman v.
City of Galveston," in which the Court held that a licensed physician has no constitutional right to practice in a public hospital. A
public hospital, however, is "required to provide certain procedural

and substantive due process rights to those physicians who are being excluded,

' 88

since the hospital's actions are deemed state ac-

tion and are thus subject to the proscriptions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.

Exclusion of a physician from the staff of a

77. JCAH MODEL BYLAws, supra note 69.
78. For a discussion of these differentiations, see authorities cited in note 62 supra.
79. 114 Ariz. 66, 559 P.2d 186 (1976).
80. Id. at 69, 559 P.2d at 189 (citing Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475,
497 P.2d 564 (1972)).
81. See, e.g., Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D. Colo. 1963);
Storm v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of America, Inc., 609 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980);
Nagib v. St. Therese Hosp., Inc., 41 IlM.App. 3d 970, 355 N.E.2d 211 (1976).
82. See Peterson v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., Inc., 114 Ariz. 66, 71, 559 P.2d 186, 189 (1976).
83. For a cogent discussion of the present status of judicial review of staff privilege
decisions by hospitals, see Kessenick & Peer, supra note 62 at 57-62.
84. 273 U.S. 414 (1927).
85. Kessenick & Peer, supra note 62, at 47. See generally id. at 47-57; McCall, supra
note 62, at 182-201.
86. See, e.g., Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968) (two
black residents denied admission to hospital staff sued and won, proving violation of their
fourteenth amendment rights and statutory rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

1981]

ACCESS TO HOSPITALS

1175

public hospital cannot be arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory;

it must be based upon standards that are fair and rationally re87
lated to the reasonable ends of the hospital.

Because of the serious effects of exclusionary action by hospitals, courts have increasingly extended due process protection to
those excluded from a "quasi-public" hospital. The leading case
extending such protection is Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital,ss in
which a hospital denied privileges to an osteopathic physician because he did not graduate from an AMA-approved school and did
not belong to the county medical society. The court found that although the hospital was "non-governmental," it was not private
because it functioned as a result of publicly solicited charitable donations. Dedicated to a public purpose, the hospital enjoyed tax
benefits because of its nonprofit nature and was the only hospital
serving an area with a population of more than 100,000.9
Several jurisdictions have consistently refused to recognize the
public-private distinction and have mandated that all hospitals accord procedural and substantive due process to physicians excluded from staff privileges.90 The courts have based the extension
In the Fourth Circuit the receipt of Hill-Burton construction funds alone has been held
sufficient to endow even a private hospital with enough state authority to make its actions
take on the character of "state action." This position, however, is the minority view. See
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 938 (1964) (racial discrimination against physicians and patients seeking access to hospitals unconstitutional). Although Simkins was justified by the federal sanction against racial discrimination in Hill-Burton recipient hospitals, the basis for the extension of Simkins
in the Fourth Circuit is less apparent. See, e.g., Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413
F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969) (denial of staff privileges to physicians on grounds that their offices
and practices were located outside the county in which the Hill-Burton recipient hospital
was located is denial of due process and equal protection). For a discussion of the relevant
issues, see Cronin, Private Hospitals that Receive Public Funds Under the Hill-Burton
Program:The State Action Implications, 12 NEw ENG. L. REv. 525 (1977). The majority of
circuits, however, refuse to recognize "state action" on the receipt of Hill-Burton funds
alone. See, e.g., Hodge v. Paoli Memorial Hosp., 576 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1978); Schlein v.
Milford Hosp., Inc., 561 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1977); Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d 392 (8th Cir.
1976); Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1000 (1975); Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosps., Inc., 487 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974); Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973);
Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973).
87. See, e.g., Theissen v. Watonga Mun. Hosp. Bd., 550 P.2d 938 (Okla. 1976) (public
hospital met standards of fairness and rational basis when it denied privileges to physician
with past drug problem offering no evidence of rehabilitation).
88. 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
89. Id. at 396, 402; 192 A.2d at 821, 824.
90. See, e.g., California: Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567
P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977); Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d
495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969) (private orthodontists' discretionary exclusion subject to judi-
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of procedural protection upon various rationales, for example, the
receipt of extensive governmental funding9 1 and the protection of a
physician's property right to practice medicine.92
When review of hospital staff decisions is permitted, the substantive grounds for dismissal must not be arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable. The often-quoted standard of reasonableness in
Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hospital3
states that matters must be reasonably related to hospital management. "No court should substitute its evaluation of [a physician's
ethical and professional competence] for that of the Hospital

Board. It is the Board, not the court, which is charged '9with the
responsibility of providing a competent staff of doctors." '
Substantial evidence of incompetence is clearly sufficient
grounds for refusing hospital staff privileges.9 5 Moreover, if the
hospital adopts new rules requiring additional experience or qualifications, application of the new standards to existing staff members is not unfair or unreasonable.98 Courts, however, have not accepted all substantive grounds for refusal, restriction, or

cial scrutiny); Ascherman v. San Francisco Med. Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr.
681 (1974); New Jersey- Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp., 79 N.J. 549, 401 A.2d 533 (1979);
Guerrero v. Burlington County Mem. Hosp., 70 N.J. 344, 360 A.2d 334 (1976); Greisman v.
Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963); Walsky v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 145 N.J.
Super. 393, 367 A.2d 1204 (1976); Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 95 N.J. Super. 418, 231
A.2d 389 (1967). Cf. Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791
(1961) (extending judicial scrutiny of such decision to private voluntary organizations such
as county medical societies).
91. See, e.g., Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n, 523 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1975); Storrs v.
Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of America, Inc., 609 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980).
92. See Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140
Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977). See also Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosps., 537 F.2d 361 (9th
Cir. 1976). For a discussion of emergent procedural causes of action, see Kessenick & Peer,
supra note 62, at 52.
93. 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971).
94. Id. at 177.
95. Id. Plaintiff in Sosa had, according to the hospital, abandoned a patient in active
labor because she could not pay her bill. The physician had also been suspended by the
licensing board of the state of Texas, had been found "guilty of two felonies," and had
shown instability toward patients, fellow physicians, and support personnel Id. at 175. Although his paper qualifications met the standards set forth in the written bylaws, the court
held that the hospital board had the authority to add supplemental requirements concerning an applicant's character. See also Battle v. Jefferson Davis Memorial Hasp., 451 F.
Supp. 1015 (S.D. Miss. 1976), aff'd, 575 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978); Rao v. Auburn Gen. Hosp.,
19 Wash. App. 124, 573 P.2d 834 (1978).
96. See, e.g., Holmes v. Hoemako Hosp., 117 Ariz. 403, 573 P.2d 477 (1977) (rule requiring staff members to carry malpractice insurance held reasonable as protecting hospital
and patients). But see Rosner v. Peninsula Hsp. Dist., 224 Cal. App. 2d 115, 36 Cal. Rptr.
332 (1964). It should be noted that the California court decided Rosner before the malpractice crisis of the 1970s and before the Darling decision.

19811

ACCESS TO HOSPITALS

1177

termination of privileges. For example, the Greisman court held
that nonmembership in the county medical association was insufficient to prevent plaintiff from attaining staff membership. Other
grounds for exclusion rejected by the courts include specialty
board certification,98 maintenance of an office in the county within
which the hospital is located,99 and failure to provide recommendations from the hospital's own active staff physicians. 10 0
A recent California case, Miller v. Eisenhower Medical
Center,10 1 held that a private hospital's exclusion of a physician
from hospital privileges must be directly related to patient care.
This case represents a significant extension of judicial intervention
in a private hospital's staff selection process. Plaintiff, a family
practitioner, had been denied staff privileges four times between
1971 and 1975. At the time of his last application he submitted the
names of twenty-five physicians whom the hospital might question
concerning his qualifications. The hospital's medical executive
committee informed plaintiff that privileges were denied "on the
basis of recommendations received from references furnished by
you." 10 2 At the subsequent hearing, requested by plaintiff before
the judicial review committee, no evidence was introduced that the
references faulted plaintiff as to his professional competence;
rather the damaging evidence concerned only his "controversial"
and "disruptive" character. 1 3 The judicial review committee affirmed the executive committee's denial of privileges, stating that
its decision was based upon "the determination that sufficient
doubt exists concerning [plaintiff's] ability to work with others as
stated... in the Medical Staff Bylaws.' ' 04
On appeal, the hospital's board also denied plaintiff privileges.
Plaintiff then sued defendant hospital, having exhausted the inter97. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
98. Armstrong v. Board of Directors of Fayette County Gen. Hosp., 553 S.W.2d 77
(Tenn. App. 1976) (public hospital must determine applicant's competency from evidence
before it; hospital most not rely exclusively upon outside specialty board standards). But see
ACCREDrrATION MANUAL, supra note 68, at 96: "Specialty Board certification or eligibility as

defined by the appropriate board is an excellent benchmark to serve as a basis for privilege
delineation." Private hospitals often employ this basis for determining privilege.
99. Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969) (no rational
classification).
100. Ascherman v. St. Francis Memorial Hosp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 507, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507
(1975).
101. 27 Cal. 3d 614, 614 P.2d 258, 166 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1980).
102. Id. at 619, 614 P.2d at 260, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
103. Id. at 620 & n.4, 614 P.2d at 261 & n.4, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 829 & n.4.
104. Id. at 620-21, 614 P.2d at 261, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
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nal procedures. The trial court found for defendant, stating that
the membership requirements were rational and neither arbitrary
nor capricious. The California Supreme Court reversed on the
grounds that the bylaw section used as a basis for exclusion did not
meet basic due process standards. The majority opinion emphasized that "ability to work with others," as stated in the medical
staff bylaws, "must.

.

.be read to demand that there be a demon-

strable nexus between the applicant's ability to 'work with' others
and the effect of that ability on the quality of patient care provided" 105 -a significant departure from the general Sosa standard
of reasonable relationship to hospital management.108 Therefore,
"an otherwise competent physician, although considered 'controversial,' outspoken, abrasive, hypercritical, or otherwise personally
offensive by some of his hospital colleagues, may nevertheless have
the ability to function as a valuable member of the hospital community and should not be denied the opportunity to do so as a
result of personal animosities or resentments alone.110 7 A "specific

and realistic" threat to the quality of medical care offered patients
must be the basis for rejecting a physician's application for
privileges.108
D. Governmental Impact on Health Care Service
The crisis of the Depression and the high rate of medical exemptions from service in the Armed Forces pointed up the need
for government programs in the health care field.109 Inspired by
World War II's demonstration of the competence of the American
people and their technology, the federal government initiated
large-scale programs to improve the nation's health care. In late
1945 President Truman sent a message to Congress requesting
legislation that would guarantee adequate health care to all
105. Id. at 628-29, 614 P.2d at 266, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
106. Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th
Cir. 1971).
107. 27 Cal. 3d at 631-32, 614 P.2d at 269, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
108. Id. In dissent, Justice Mask asserted that the majority opinion had blurred the
line between due process rules applicable to private hospitals and those applicable to public
hospitals. Id. at 636, 614 P.2d at 272, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 840 (Mask, J., dissenting). In his
opinion, the one exception that would justify judicial interference in private hospital matters would be monopoly status by the hospital institution, a position substantially undercut
by Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 572 P.2d 32, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977), in which the
same court held that due process does not necessarily depend upon the existence of monopoly power held by an institution when that institution has the practical power to affect
substantially an important economic interest.
109. R. RUSHMER, supra note 17, at 12.
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Americans."'
For the purposes of this Note, the first of President Truman's
five objectives-the building or modernization of physical hospital
facilities"'-has particular relevance, since it resulted in the passage of the Hill-Burton Act.1 2 Although laudable as an isolated
policy objective, this goal combined with hospital-oriented insurance plans such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield s to produce not
only a "boom" in hospital construction, but also a skewed concentration of health power in the hospital and a concomitant neglect
of other possible competitive institutional providers such as nursing and convalescent homes, surgical centers, and out-patient
treatment centers. The hospital became the primary focus of medical service, and hospital staff privileges for doctors became an economic and professional necessity. Denied hospital access, the medical specialist in many fields cannot practice, and the medical
generalist loses his patients to physicians with access; this exacerbates the perceived impersonality of medical treatment and increases the risk of malpractice suits. ,
The groundwork for President Truman's third objective -encouragement of medical education and research-predates the

post-World War II health care explosion.1 14 The well-financed and
successful research done under government-supported programs
during the war was a primary factor in reducing the profession's
suspicions about socialized medicine and in showing the medical
110. President Harry S. Truman, Message to Congress on Health Legislation, [1945]
U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1143. The President listed five areas in which governmental support
was necessary: the construction of hospitals and related health facilities; the expansion of
public health, maternal, and children's services; encouragement of medical education and
research; prepayment of medical costs to insure access to medical services; and protection
against lost income by the working man during sickness or disability.
111. For a discussion of the purpose as expressed in the legislative history of HillBurton, see Note, Due Process for Hill-Burton Assisted Facilities,32 VAND. L. Rxv. 1469,
1475 (1979).
112. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, ch. 958, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1976 & Supp. 11 1979)).
113. "Private medical insurance has focused primarily on medical services rendered
within a hospital." K. DAvIs, NATiONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: BENEFITS, COSTS, AND CONSEQUENCES 19 (1975). Blue Cioss, organized during the Depression when hospital revenue and
patient occupancy dropped precipitously, currently has approximately 40% of the hospital
insurance market. It was largely financed by hospitals, and until 1972 the Blue Cross name
and insignia were owned by the American Hospital Association. Until very recently, most
health insurance policies have excluded reimbursement to alternative institutions such as
nursing homes, outpatient facilities, and surgicenters, in which hospital stay is minimized
for minor surgical procedures. Id. at 19-20 (quoting S. LAw, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT
WRONG 6-7, 18-30 (1974)).
114. R. RUsHMER, supra note 17, at 13.
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community the opportunities offered by government financing of
research. This new emphasis on research accompanied the enthusiastic move toward specialization. Once again the result was to funnel physicians into a hospital situation in which clinical research
was possible.
E.

Technological Innovation

Although intraprofessional restraints and governmental regulations have significantly molded the relationship between physician and hospital, their effect has been conditioned largely upon
the third major influence upon that relationship, the rise of medical technology. Patient dependence solely upon the family physician has been replaced by reliance upon a battery of specialists,
who, in turn, depend upon the proliferation of technology that has
become the hallmark of modern American medicine.
The enormous "economic" costs of technology in combination
with third-party payment, patient-consumer ignorance, increasing
labor costs, and the general orientation of the individual physician
to the individual patient 115 have contributed to the massive inflation in health care costs over the past quarter-century.1 10 While
some critics have suggested a complete structural reorganization of
medicine, 17 the need for cost containment has generated only
piecemeal responses, such as the "certificate of need" legislation in
the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of
115. For good general discussions of these and other health care issues, see Blumstein
& Zubkoff, Public Choice in Health: Problems, Politics and Perspectives on Formulating
National Health Policy, 4 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 382 (1979); Blumstein & Zubkoff,
Perspectives on Government Policy in the Health Sector, 51 MILBANK MEMORIAL FuND Q.
395 (1973).
In a normal transaction, the buyer of goods pays the seller directly out of his own assets; such direct payment induces the buyer to compare prices and forces the seller to offer
his goods and services at a reasonably competitive price. In a health care transaction, however, third parties-insurance companies-bear the direct cost of health services. Thus, no
incentive on the part of the patient or the health care provider to "count the cost" is present. Moreover, the economic concept of "consumer sovereignty" cannot operate if the consumer-patient does not have the knowledge to make an informed choice about his health
care alternatives. The doctor or other health care provider traditionally makes all such decisions for him. In making such decisions, the physician is, quite naturally, oriented toward
using whatever resources are available to maximize the well-being of his individual patient,
rather than toward using the available resources to maximize the public benefit.
116. Health care represented slightly under 10% of the GNP during the past decade.
Blumstein & Zubkoff, Public Choice in Health:Problems, Politics and Perspectiveson Formulating National Health Policy, supra note 115, at 396.
117. See, e.g., R. CARLSON, THE END OF MEDICINE (1975); E. GINSBERG, THE L rrS OF
HEALTH REFORM: THE SEARCH FOR REALISM (1977); A. SoMERs, supra note 1, at 34-35.
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1974.118

The innovators in medical technology at the great academic
medical centers have taught physicians to rely upon technology 19
and to utilize their technological expertise in an ever-narrowing
medical subspecialty. This technological dependence-in combination with rapid hospital growth-has been predictable: "as these
young specialists left the hallowed halls of academe to use their
hard-won skills, they set up shop in these new hospitals and established highly sophisticated subspecialty units that duplicated those
on which they had been trained in teaching centers."1 20
For purposes of this Note, the more important effect of technological innovation and subspecialty proliferation has been a concentration of these expensive services in the hospital institution.1 21
Hospital accreditation committees and often state law122 require
hospitals to maintain such subspecialty services, resulting in the
reinforcement of the hospital's power and a concomitant diminution in ease of access for highly-trained medical professionals. The
reduced access follows in part from the common practice of exclusive dealing contracts. Because the hospital requires certain highly
technical services on an "as need" basis,125 and because it is economically more sound, a hospital often contracts with a single specialist or small group of specialists to run the particular service to
the exclusion of other physicians either on the staff or desirous of
becoming affiliated with that hospital. Courts have traditionally
upheld such contracts, finding the hospital's action reasonable
when the "practical problems inherent in operating an institution
as complex as a hospital [are balanced] against the restriction on
the right of an individual physician to practice the specialty for
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (Supp. HI 1979).
119. See also Vogel, supra note 1, at 112-13, quoting a turn-of-the-century physician,
Dr. Thomas Howell:
Not having been taught to improvise, they do not realize how much can be accomplished with the crude implements to be found in the ordinary household. The graduates of cheaply equipped institutions, on the other hand, have been required to exercise
ingenuity throughout their apprenticeship, and, as a result, they are not only more

resourceful in emergencies, but their adaptability enhances their professional
reputation.
Id.
120.
tion, 298
121.
122.
service).
123.

Rogers & Blenden, The Academic Medical Center: A Stressed American InstituNEW ENG. J. MEn. 946 (1978).
See ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 68.
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-5201 (1976) (duty to furnish emergency room
See Kessenick & Peer, supra note 62.
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which he or she has been trained."12
In Dattilo v. Tucson General Hospital2 5 defendant hospital
gave an exclusive contract in nuclear medicine to two physicians
other than plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit against the hospital alleging a common law restraint of trade as well as a violation of
state antitrust law. The court upheld the contract, stating that
contracts such as those in areas of medical specialty inextricably
bound to the hospital-radiology, nuclear medicine, and pathology,
for example-are necessary for several reasons: to maintain control
and standardization of procedure, to ensure the effective, efficient
operation of the department in question and greater ease of monitoring by the hospital board, and to guarantee better patient care
through better scheduling. 128 The court also cited other reasons to
uphold the contract: the economical operation of the department,
more consistent training of technicians, and the contracting specialists' ability to avail themselves of medical and technical advances in the field. Finally, the court found no7 interference with
12
the right of a patient to select his own doctor.

Based on this overwhelming list of justifications, the court
held that "this exclusive contract is necessary for proper patient
care."1 28 The court found no unreasonable interference with plaintiff's right to practice medicine, since he retained his internal
medicine privileges, even though defendant hospital was the only
osteopathic hospital in the vicinity and plaintiff was an osteopath.
Hospitals usually grant exclusive dealing contracts in highly
specialized technological areas, such as pathology and radiology,
which they consider essential to the adequate provision of a wide
range of medical services. Hospitals and the courts treat an exclusive dealing contract within one of the broad-based specialties as if
such a contract were a "natural monopoly." Blumstein and Zubkoff
assert that this form of monopoly occurs
when cost structure and market size make competition inefficient and unfeasible. If market size and production technology allow a single firm to operate
in the decreasing cost portion of the long-run cost curve, with any additional
output at lower marginal cost, then the economies of scale cannot be ex124. Id. at 70. See, e.g., Benell v. City of Virginia, 258 Minn. 559, 104 N.W.2d 633
(1960). In Benell, one of the earliest exclusive dealing contract cases, the court relied upon
the complexity of radiology equipment, the need for a high degree of expertise to use the
equipment, and the desire for efficiency and uniformity in upholding the contract.
125. 23 Ariz. App. 392, 533 P.2d 700 (1975).
126. See id. at 396-97, 533 P.2d at 704-05.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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hausted at any given level of market demand.... The utility companies are
often cited as the example of this form of monopoly. In the utility case, the
economies of scale in production and distribution are so marked that if several companies were in competition, costs would be substantially higher
and
12
significant inconvenience and misallocation of resources would occur. 9

In the medical field the clearest example of a "natural monopoly" is the rural hospital, because it "provid[es] a service for which
there is no close substitute and [operates in a market] in which
additional entry is not economically feasible because of the high
capital costs and economies of scale." 130 These justifications almost
always apply to the exclusive dealing contract as a natural monopoly because any individual hospital-rural, urban, or suburban-is
viewed as a self-contained unit of production "for which there is no
close substitute" and a market into which "additional entry is not
economically feasible." Staff privileges are highly visible evidence
of this perception, since privileges are granted on a hospital by
hospital basis. 13 1 Thus, the effect of the exclusive dealing contract
on hospital privileges is to restrict entry by other qualified physi13 2
cians because of the "high capital costs and economies of scale.
Government's intuitive response to the high cost of medical
technology and to the evidence of "market failure" inherent in
monopoly has been intervention, but intervention that does not interfere with productivity. 3 8 The most visible governmental response-certificate of need legislation"-is often applied to the
129. Blumstein & Zubkoff, Perspectives on Government Policy in the Health Sector,
supra note 115, at 403.
130. Id. at 404.
131. See ACCREDITATION MANUAL supra note 68, at 96.
132. See, e.g., Marsh v. Finley, 160 N.J. Super. 193, 389 A.2d 490, 491 (1978):
The cost of acquiring [a C.A.T. scanner] ranges from $350,000 to $550,000 and,
after site preparation, from $400,000 to $600,000. In addition, operational costs, depending upon the numbers of procedures performed range from $290,000 to $301,500
per year. This includes extensive technical and professional staff necessary to operate
the equipment and perform the diagnostic procedures associated with the equipment.
133. See Blumstein & Zubkoff, Perspectives on Government Policy in the Health
Sector, supra note 115, at 396-405. See also Blumstein & Calvani, State Action as a Shield
and a Sword in a Medical Services Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in Constitutional
Perspective, 1978 DUKE L.J. 389, 391-92.
134. National Health Planning & Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93641, 88 Stat. 2225 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976), as amended by Health Planning & Resources Development Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, 93 Stat. 592).
In its broadest sense, certificate of need (CON) legislation is a kind of governmental
regulatory control over health facilities' capital expenditures. Under § 1122 of the Social
Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1386 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a.1 (1976), as amended by Act of Nov. 1, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-559, § 14(b), 92 Stat.
2141), federal reimbursement for certain capital costs is denied unless capital expenditures
are made with state health planning agency approval. Under the National Health Planning
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technology underlying most exclusive dealing contracts. The certificate of need (CON) theoretically distributes high capital cost
items among hospitals within a given community or geographical
area. The majority view, however, is that the program has been a
failure: "the most damaging piece of evidence in support of this
conclusion is the extremely high approval rate in those states with
CON programs-the great majority of all projects submitted for
review have been approved."'13 5 Perhaps one reason for this failure
is a rejection by CON committees of the theoretical model of the
individual hospital as a single unit within a larger production
model in favor of the "naturally monopolistic" concept of technologically dependent units within a single hospital-a view reinforced by accreditation standards and by the courts.3 8
Courts tolerate and even encourage natural monopolies because their economic and social benefits accrue not only to the monopolists themselves but also to the community at large. In the
medical industry exclusive dealing contracts protect and regulate
many of the naturally monopolistic broad-based subspecialties. In
contrast to these are other technologically dependent procedures
within subspecialties which threaten to become "unnatural monopolies": "situation[s] in which a producer is supplying its market
with a good for which there are no close substitutes. The monopolist, in order to maximize profits, will restrict output and charge
high prices."' 37 In other words, community benefit is significantly
lessened while primary benefits accrue to the monopolists themselves. The antitrust laws are generally concerned with the unnatural monopoly offense. Some technologies that began as "natural"
monopolies and were protected by exclusive dealing contractual
and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976), as amended by Health Planning & Resources Development
Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, 93 Stat. 592), states without agencies to conduct
CON review by 1980 will be denied funds for development, expansion, or support of health
resources. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300m(d), 300m-2(a)(4)(B) (1976). See generally H. HYmAN, HEALTH
REGULATION: CERTn'IcATE OF NEED AND 1122 (1977); Schonbrun, Making Certificate of Need
Work, 57 N.C. L. REv. 1259 (1979). The certificate of need also attempts to correct another
problem related to the exclusive dealing contract: that technology conforms to Roemer's
law-the variation of which might read "a CAT scanner bought is a CAT scanner used." See
Roemer, Bed Supply and Hospital Utilization, HosPrrALs, Nov. 1, 1961, at 36, quoted in
Schonbrun, supra, at 1263 ("A bed built is a bed filled.").
135. A twenty state study conducted in 1975 found that 93% of all CON projects submitted to review were approved. Schonbrun, supra note 134, at 1266 & n.37.
136. See, e.g., North Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Office of Community Medical Facilities, 355
So. 2d 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
137. Blumstein & Zubkoff, Perspectives on Government Policy in the Health Sector,
supra note 115, at 403.
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arrangements may be in the process of transformation into "unnatural" monopolies with the passage of time, the proliferation of
successful alternative techniques, and, ironically, improved
technology. 138

IV.

EMERGENT IssuEs: THE DEMAND FOR ACCESS

The health care industry has been perhaps the most vigorous
industry of the past forty years. This dynamism will probably continue despite the varied pressures exerted upon the health care
field by intraprofessional governance, continued expansion of technological dependence, and governmental restraints ranging from
mere influence to outright regulation. As discussed previously,
however, the effect of these various pressures has been to limit access to hospitals while simultaneously elevating the hospital to its
premier status as the legitimizing institution in the health care industry. Two important challenges have been aimed at the exclusivity and economic self-protection endemic to hospital privilege systems, which are but one characteristic of the hospital monolith.
An increase in antitrust actions in the health care field has
presented one challenge to the privilege system. Competing institutions, such as surgical outpatient centers or birthing centers, may
present attractive, safe, and economical alternatives to the upwardly-spiralling costs of inpatient hospital care. By denying hospital privileges to the professionals staffing such alternative institutions, or, more blatantly, by denying continuing privileges to
those professionals attempting to serve on the staffs of both institutions, the hospital could expose itself to antitrust liability.139 The
importance, and limitation, of antitrust litigation is determined to
a significant degree by the challenge to physicians' entrenched
138. For example, in Moles v. White, 336 So. 2d 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), the
court refused to review the denial of privileges by a private hospital to an open-heart surgeon even though the hospital was the only one in the community with necessary facilities.
With the decreased technological costs attendant upon open-heart surgery, it is probable
that cases like Moles will be more closely scrutinized for antitrust violations.
139. Recent literature has scrutinized extensively the increase of antitrust litigation in
the health care field. See, e.g., Borsody, The Antitrust Laws and the Health Industry, 12
AKRON L. REv. 417 (1979); Calvani & James, Antitrust Law and the Practiceof Medicine, 2
J. LEGAL MED. 75 (1980); Curran, The Confrontation Between National Health Planning
and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 70 Am. J. PuB. HEALTH 425 (1980); Grad, The Antitrust
Laws and Professional Discipline in Medicine, 1978 DuKE L.J. 443; Rich, Medical Staff
Privileges and the Antitrust Laws, 2 WHrriER L. REv. 667 (1980); Rosoff, Antitrust Laws
and the Health Care Industry: New Warriors in an Old Battle, 23 ST. Louis U. L.J. 446
(1979); Note, supra note 39.
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dominance of hospital privileges by other health professionals. 140
This Note now turns to an examination of several of these professional challenges.
A.

Osteopaths

Osteopathic physicians (D.O.s) were the first group of health
professionals other than licensed medical doctors (M.D.s) to push
for acceptance onto hospital staffs, and they have, by and large,
achieved parity with M.D.s. The only Supreme Court case to examine the right of hospital access arose when a state hospital denied staff privileges to an osteopathic physician because he was an
osteopath.
Plaintiff based his claim upon equal protection and
due process grounds, but the Court held that exclusion of an osteopathic physician from a state hospital was within the state's police
power. The Court found that licensed physicians have no constitutional right to practice medicine in a state institution. Moreover,
hospital management necessitates "some choice in methods of
treatment . . . and selection [of medical staff members] based
upon a classification having some basis in the exercise of the judgment of the state board whose action if challenged is not a denial
1' 42
of equal protection of the laws.
Excluded osteopaths have brought many of the landmark
cases concerning hospital access. Falcone v. Middlesex County
Medical Society1 4 held that a county medical society's unwritten
requirement that all potential members be graduates of a fouryear, AMA-approved medical school was arbitrary, unreasonable,
and illegal. Plaintiff had attended a four-year osteopathic college
that offered instruction in all "normal" medical subjects as well as
in osteopathic theory. He was unrestrictedly licensed by the state
of New Jersey. Following the declaration of ineligibility by the
medical society, area hospitals dropped plaintiff from their staffs
because they required staff members to be members of the local
society. Thus, the local medical society had a "virtual monopoly
over the use of local hospital facilities 1 144 and was not entitled to
the same protection afforded voluntary membership organizations
140. See, e.g., Nurse Midwifery: Consumers' Freedom of Choice, HearingBefore the
House Comm. on Oversight and Investigation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 18, 1980) (investigation of denial of access to nurse-midwives) [hereinafter cited as Hearing].
141. Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927).
142. Id. at 417.
143. 34 N.J. 592, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
144. Id. at 598, 170 A.2d at 799.
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since it was a society "which engages in activities vitally affecting
the health and welfare of the people."14 5 Finding that the medical
society had breached its fiduciary duty to the public, the court afcompelling admission of
firmed the lower court's writ of mandamus
14 6
plaintiff into the county medical society.
The historical basis for denial of hospital privileges to osteopaths lies in the discipline's original dedication to bone manipulation as a means of "structural realignment" for the cure of all disease.1 47 Although such a theory was no less reasonable than other
similar theories advanced during the years predating scientific
medicine, osteopathy's fervent adherents refused to consider or
recognize growing scientific knowledge about the nature of illness

and its cure.14 8 Therefore, with some justification the AMA condemned practitioners of osteopathy as "cultists" and forbade
M.D.s to associate professionally with D.O.s. By 1940, however, osteopathic colleges were teaching the bases of scientific medicine as
well as osteopathic manipulation, and in recent decades the education received by M.D.s and D.O.s has become virtually indistinguishable. Legal recognition followed, and most states now grant
14 9
unrestricted licenses to D.O.s.
Blackstone contends that, in spite of legal recognition of
D.O.s, the AMA has always had monopolistic intent with respect to
osteopathy.1 5 0 He cites numerous attempts by organized medicine
to restrict potential competition by osteopaths: opposition to inclu145. Id.
146. Other exclusion cases involving osteopaths include: Don v. Okmulgee Memorial
Hosp., 443 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1971); Peterson v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., Inc., 114 Ariz. 66, 559
P.2d 186 (1976) (exclusion held proper because of failure to maintain adequate hospital
records); Dattilo v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 23 Ariz. App. 392, 533 P. 2d 700 (1975); Greisman v.
Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963) (quasi-public hospital's exclusion of doctor could not be arbitrary or capricious); Hagan v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp., 102 R.I. 717, 232
A.2d 596 (1967) (exclusion of osteopathic physician held proper on grounds of personality
conflict with hospital administrator, hospital board's preference for another physician, and
his potential to be a disruptive force in hospital); Fritz v. Huntington Hosp., 48 A.D.2d 614,
367 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1975) (exclusion of osteopaths held proper on grounds that they failed to
complete an AMA-approved internship or residency). See also text accompanying notes 7587 supra.
147. See Note, Malpracticeand the Healing Arts-Naturopathy,Osteopathy, Chiropractic, 9 UTAH L. Rav. 705, 710 (1965). The founder of osteopathy said "we use the bones
as fulcrums and levers to adjust from the abnormal to the normal that the harmonious
functioning of the viscera of the whole body may show forth perfection, that condition
which is known as good health." Id. at 709 (quoting BOOTH, HISTORY OF OSTEOPATHY 399
(1905)).
148. See id. at 710.
149. See id. at 711.
150. Blackstone, supra note 40. See also E. RAYACK, supra note 20, at 241-53.
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sive licensure, denial of hospital access, prevention of governmental recognition and financial support of osteopathy, and refusal to
allow, on ethical grounds, consultation or teaching privileges between M.D.s and D.O.s. 151 Another indication of monopolistic intent by the AMA was its exclusion of osteopaths from participation
in AMA-approved internships and residencies. This restriction,
however, may have actually had a salutary effect on the practice of
medicine as a whole. In the post-World War II period, osteopaths,
excluded from the specialties, filled the void in general practice left
by M.D.s who entered medical specialties in overwhelming
numbers.' 52
It was not until 1961 that the AMA relaxed its interdict
against association with D.O.s. Immediately D.O.s gained admission into AMA-approved speciality training, and the incomes of
both D.O.s and M.D.s increased, since the latter were now "ethically" able to receive referrals from the former. 5 ' Another significant
development in 1961 was the merger of the California Medical Association with the California Osteopathic Association. The terms
for merger were as follows: first, the transformation of the California osteopathic medical school into a school with certified AMA
approval; second, the issuance of an M.D. degree to each osteopath
holding an unlimited California license; third, the creation of a new
medical society to accommodate the combined disciplines; and last,
support of legislation to prevent future state licensing of D.O.s and
elimination of the Board of Ostepathic Examiners except for those
54
recalcitrant osteopaths who refused merger.
Although the AMA has enthusiastically embraced the concept
of merger, the American Osteopathic Association is interested in
preserving its own identity. That reduction of competition would
result from merger is undeniable. It is also undisputed that organized medicine's motives have been open to question in the past.
151. See Blackstone, supra note 40, at 411-17. In the late 1950s Congress granted to
osteopaths the right to hold medical commissions in the Armed Forces, Armed Forces Act,
Pub. L. No. 85-861, § 1(77), 72 Stat. 1467 (1958) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 3294 (1976)); to
serve in Veterans Administration Hospitals, Veterans Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 85-857, 72
Stat. 1244 (1958) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 4105 (1976)); and to participate in the Public
Health Service, Public Health Service Act, ch. 83, § 5(b), 62 Stat. 40 (1948) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 209(d) (1976)).
152. See Blackstone, supra note 40, at 417.
153. See generally id.
154. Id. at 418-19. See also Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons of Cal. v. California
Medical Ass'n, 224 Cal. App. 2d 378, 36 Cal. Rptr. 641 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (California
District Court of Appeal upheld the merger despite opposition from osteopaths).
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For example, it was not until the 1960s when the supply of M.D.s
was extremely low that the AMA finally tapped the alternative
source of interns and residents from osteopathy by giving its approval to the acceptance of D.O.s into AMA-approved programs.
As Blackstone points out, the legitimacy of the "quality" argument
upon which exclusion of osteopaths had been based was questionable in light of the AMA's previous acceptance of foreign medical
15 5
graduates into such programs.
From the health policy perspective, total merger is not an attractive alternative. Competition between parallel medical care delivery systems of equal quality and efficiency can only benefitthe
consumer-patient. Moreover, the traditional strengths of the osteopathic physician in the area of general practice are necessary to
meet health care demand in the next decade. 5 6 If a merger of osteopathic and allopathic medicine should occur, the traditional supply of general practitioners generated by osteopathic colleges could
diminish at a time when such physicians are most needed. Furthermore, osteopaths have traditionally sought less highly developed
and more rural areas in which to practice. If complete absorption
were accomplished, the same reluctance exhibited by M.D.s to go
outside the urban or suburban setting may well extend to their
1 57
new D.O. associates.
155. See Blackstone, supra note 40, at 421.
156. The Graduate Medical Education National Advisory Conmittee explicitly divided osteopathic general practice from "allopathic" family practice and predicted that each
will have 105% of the practitioners necessary to meet the projected need in 1990. GMENAC
SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 40, at 4, fig. 1. See generally Bloom, supra note 60.

157. See Blackstone, supra note 40, at 431. Blackstone offers other arguments against
merger. See id. at 430-31.
A second problem concerns general practitioners. As the supply of physicians expands
and competition increases, physicians (both M.D. and D.O.) with less training are in potential danger of being "squeezed out" of specialized hospital staff privileges. The prime example is the restriction on surgical privileges granted to the general practitioners (G.P.). Note
the effect of the multi-tiered certification approach to hospital privileges advocated by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. See ACCREDrrATION MANUAL, supra note
68, at 95-99. See also AM. MED. NEws, Oct. 17, 1980, at 1 (discussing the American Academy
of Family Practitioners' agreement to support a Nebraska lawsuit brought by excluded general practitioners and a general surgeon against the American College of Surgeons).
The restricting hospital's arguments generally follow the "quality" defense offered in
Dattilo and other exclusive contract cases. The general practitioner counters by citing a
need to treat the "whole" patient, especially when the G.P. is qualified to perform such
procedures. Hospitals respond in different ways, for example by allowing categories of privileges with certain levels of training required for each category, see ACCREDrrATION MANUAL,
supra note 68, at 95-99, or by following "grandfather" clauses-allowing G.P.s with less
training to continue operating in their areas of demonstrated competence, but with yearly
quality review. See Yankauer, Who Shall Deliver Primary Care?, 70 AM. J. PUn. HEALTH
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From a policy perspective, there is presently no rational
ground upon which to base wholesale denial of hospital privileges
to an osteopath solely because his professional degree is "D.O." instead of "M.D." To do so would undoubtedly raise a serious threat
of antitrust litigation. Moreover, for the first time in history, an
equally sophisticated competitor is challenging the M.D. Thus,
such competition should be encouraged and not dulled by merger
or by the historical bias against osteopaths.
B. Podiatrists
A podiatrist has four years of specialized training in diseases
of the foot. Although the American Podiatry Association has been
actively campaigning for increased hospital access over the past
fifteen years, courts have generally upheld the right of the hospital
to exclude, provided the basis for nonadmittance is reasonable. 158
A significant impetus, however, for the medical establishment's acceptance of the podiatrist has been the rise in popularity of running and jogging with their attendant foot injuries. 15 9 Although,
under Standard I of the Medical Staff certification requirements,
the Accreditation Manual states that "[m]edical staff membership
shall be limited, unless otherwise provided by law, to individuals
who are currently fully licensed to practice medicine and, in addition, to licensed dentists," the same standard later delineates extensively the privileges available to podiatrists.16 0 The podiatrist
must be appropriately licensed to obtain clinical privileges, but, if
the hospital bylaws refer specifically to podiatric privileges, he is
afforded the same kinds of privileges as any other specialist within
the area of his expertise.
1048 (1980).
158. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hospital Auth., 614 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1980). See generally
Hollowell, The Growing Legal Contest-HospitalPrivileges for Podiatrists,23 ST. Louis U.

L.J. 491 (1979).
159. See, e.g., Brody, Running Injuries, 32 CLINICAL SYmpOSIA (no. 4, 1980).
160. See ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 68, at 93, 97-98 (emphasis added). The
JCAH amended its accreditation manual to allow podiatrists to admit patients with the
concurrence of a medical doctor. This amendment was part of the settlement reached in
Levin v. Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Hosps., 354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1965), an antitrust suit brought by a podiatrist challenging exclusionary hospital practices. The trial court

found that compliance with the JCAH standards, which at that time did not sanction the
granting of staff privileges to podiatrists, was sufficient to support the defendant's motion

for summary judgment. Levin v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 233 F. Supp. 953, 955 (D.D.C. 1964).
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that a court should not decide a com-

plex antitrust suit on summary judgment; thus, the court avoided the substantive issue. 354
F.2d at 518.
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The admission of podiatrists to hospital staffs clearly illus-

trates the current dilemma in health care delivery. On the one
hand, there is a great push to attain the social goals of medical cost
containment, the development of less expensive but equally effective alternative methods of delivery, and decreased emphasis on
inpatient hospital use. On the other hand, there is the perception
held by the public and by the health care profession that patients
and professionals should not be denied the "essential facilities of a
twentieth century hospital." 161 Whether the hospital is "essential"
to all health care delivery in the last fifth of the twentieth century
is perhaps the central issue.
C. Chiropractors
A recent study suggests that the public does not perceive chiropractors as being interchangeable with physicians; they have "a
constituency of [their] own." 1

2

Thus, even when orthodox medical

practitioners are available, chiropractors will not suffer a loss of
clients; conversely, chiropractic does not seem to be a competitive
63
threat to medicine.1

Chiropractic theory postulates that all illness and disease arise
from a single cause: "subluxation" or misalignment of the spinal
vertebrae that causes nerve compression and, in turn, disease. The
"chiropractic cure" involves palpation and manipulation of these
vertebrae in order to "adjust" them. Until very recently, the only
legal attention focused upon chiropractic has concerned territorial
disputes arising between its schools of practice6 4 and the defense
of chiropractors in either tort 1 5 or criminal cases. 66 Within the
161. Shaw v. Hospital Auth., 507 F.2d 625, 629 (5th Cir. 1975) (Brown, C.J.,
concurring).
162. Silver, Chiropractic:Professional Controversy and Public Policy, 70 AM. J. PUB.

348, 348 (1980).
163. See id.

HEALTH

164. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 413 A.2d 882 (Del.
1980). Two schools have merged within chiropractic organization. The first school"straight" chiropractic-believes that only the practitioner's hands should be used to read-

just the spine. The second, more liberal school, called "mixer," believes that chiropractic
may incorporate additional methods of treatment, such as light, heat, water, electricity, and
vitamins. See Note, supra note 147, at 713.
165. See, e.g., Malmstrom v. Olsen, 16 Utah 2d 316, 400 P.2d 209 (1965) (chiropractor
found guilty of malpractice after violent jerk of the neck ruptured plaintiff's cervical disks
and produced paralysis).
166. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 42 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), rev'd and
vacated, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966) (chiropractor charged with
felony murder following the death of an eight year old child suffering from cancer).
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last three years, however, several suits16 7 have alleged that radiolo-

gists and others have conspired (by refusing professional consultation) to boycott chiropractors.16 8 If the courts follow the per se
rules generally applicable to group boycotts,""' then no matter
what professional justification the radiologists may have for refusing to consult, the finding of a group boycott could automatically
result in a successful antitrust suit.
If, instead, courts adopt the rule of reason approach 17 0 radi-

ologists would have to establish that concern for patient health as
opposed to anticompetitive design is the motivation for the collective refusal to deal.1 L-Calvani and James, however, suggest that
even under the rule of reason group boycotts of chiropractors will
trigger the imposition of antitrust penalties, primarily because consumer protection may demand that radiologists "oversee" the
167. E.g., New Jersey Chiropractic Soc'y v. Radiological Soc'y, 156 N.J. Super. 365,
383 A.2d 1182 (1978); Wilk v. AMA, No. Civ. 76C 3777 (N.D. I1. Jan. 31, 1981).
On January 30, 1981, a jury directed a verdict in favor of defendants in Wilk on all
antitrust counts. Plaintiffs are appealing the verdict. See New York Times, Feb. 1, 1981, § 1,
at 19; 24 Am. MFD. NEws, Feb. 13, 1981, at 1, col. 1. See also Wolinsky, What the Jurors
Heard as Chiropractic Trial Concluded, 24 AM. MED. NEws, Feb. 13, 1981, at 34, col. 1. As
reported by Wolinsky, the "quality" defense was among the arguments used by defendants.
The AMA contended that its opposition to chiropractic was based upon "protect[ion of] the
public from health hazards, rather than protect[ion of medicine's] economic interests." Id.
In addition, another defendant, the American College of Radiologists, stated that opposition
to chiropractic was actually detrimental to the economic interests of radiologists but that
such opposition was covered under the first amendment right to free speech. Id. at col. 3.
168. Under the 1972 revision to the Social Security laws, chiropractors may receive
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for treatment of "subluxation" confirmed by X-ray.
Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 273(a), 86 Stat. 1329 (codified at
42 U.S.C. 1395x(r) (1976)). See generally Calvani & James, supra note 139, at 83-89.
169. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that group boycotts are
per se violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); this forecloses the consideration of justifications and defenses offered by defendants. See generally 2 E. KrNzR, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw §§ 10.30-.31 (1980); Note, supra note 39.
In order to establish violation of the Sherman [Anti-Trust] Act it is not necessary
to show that the challenged arrangement suppresses all competition between the parties or that the parties themselves are discontented with the arrangement. The interest
of the public in the preservation of competition is the primary consideration. The
prohibitions of the statute cannot "be evaded by good motives. The law is its own
measure of right and wrong, of what it permits, or forbids, and the judgment of the
courts cannot be set up against it in a supposed accommodation of its policy with the
good intention of parties, and it may be, of some good results."
Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 44 (1930) (footnote omitted).
170. Some lower federal courts have in recent years recognized that "the purpose of
every refusal to deal is not to further some anticompetitive objective." 2 E. KMrN , supra
note 169, § 10.31 at 168-69.
171. See note 167 supra. See also Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978).
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practicing chiropractor since "[ilt may be that consultation with
radiologists will uncover disease which would have gone undetected and untreated in the hands of a chiropractor alone." 172 In
addition, the assumption in an antitrust analysis is that consumers
are the best judges of what is in their interest: "To deny this assumption is to suggest that government enforced consumer protection regulation ought supplant antitrust and the [medical] econ17
omy it seeks to protect.1
In response to the first fear expressed by Calvani and James,
the threat of disease undetected by chiropractors, it would be more
reasonable to penalize the chiropractor rather than the radiologist.
Antitrust law should not burden the radiologist with responsibility
for the chiropractor's predictable mistakes. In addition, it seems
that chiropractors are attempting to have it "both ways": they argue that the same standards do not apply to chiropractic as to scientific medicine, 174 yet demand that radiologists legitimize chiropractors by consultation. If the true goal of antitrust legislation is
"consumer welfare,"1 75 then perhaps the chiropractors should be
upgraded through more stringent educational requirements into
true "competitors." Moreover, if chiropractic is indeed a separate
"paradigm," then antitrust litigation is an improper cause of action. If there is indeed no competition, then there is no basis for an
antitrust suit. It seems specious to suggest that simply because
radiologists and chiropractors use the same X-ray technology, the
former should oversee the latter.
In answer to Calvani and James' second concern, consumer
protection regulation has often supplanted antitrust law. 7 To suggest that "government-enforced consumer protection regulation" is
a new concept in the field of health care is to ignore, for example,
the justification for the licensure laws that define initially the areas
in which the physician or the chiropractor is competent to practice.
172. Calvani & James, supra note 139, at 89.
173. Id. at 88-89.
174. [Chiropractic] does not pretend to be, nor does it ask to be considered, as a
form of medical practice. It does not see itself simply as a deranged form of scientific
medicine, but outside the theoretical structure of modern medicine altogether. It sees
itself as an integrated healing system. In the popular parlance of the day, it is a separate "paradigm." It is unscientific by scientific medical standards ....
Since chiropractors ask to be judged solely on their own standards, it is pointless to examine the
theory or practice by the standards of orthodox medicine.
Silver, supra note 162, at 348 (emphasis in original). See generally Note, supra note 147, at
721 n.129.
175. Calvani & James, supra note 139, at 76.
176. See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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At present, chiropractors seem to seek hospital entry through
the back door, demanding access to hospital records and radiological consultation. Such legitimization is unwise when viewed from
the long-range health policy perspective. The granting of further
hospital access would be a significant setback in the current attempts to deemphasize hospital care-one proven means for
achieving the ultimate policy goal of cost containment. Chiropractors have treated their clients successfully-if consumer satisfaction is a guide-for years outside the hospital institution, working
under the philosophy that "burden of health resides with the patient, and [that] it is within the patient that the motivation and
ability for health accrue." 1' 7 Increased patient responsibility for his
own health is an approach currently advocated as a cost containment method. If the "burden of health" resides with the patient,
then the emphasis is on prevention, and "the result is less reliance
on expensive institutional care." Such nonhospital-based philosophy should be encouraged.
The potential for hospital liability for a chiropractor's misdiagnosis caused by justifiable ignorance probably constitutes a rational and nonarbitrary basis for a hospital's denial of staff privileges to a chiropractor."" To suggest that the chiropractor be
granted staff privileges on the same basis as the physician or podiatrist-with medical review of his patients-is to ignore the real
differences in the standards and philosophic bases of scientific
medicine and chiropractic.
As an example of the problems following from these different
orientations toward medical practice, the radiologic confirmation
of the chiropractic subluxation mandated by the 1972 Social Security amendments1 has resulted in hopeless confusion. To most
radiologists, "subluxation" does not exist.18 0 To most chiropractors,
science has nothing to do with chiropractic. Moreover, since patients also view chiropractic as an alternative to medicine,"8 ' it is
uncertain whether consumers of chiropractic would consent to
medical overview. Again, perhaps, the wiser legislative course
177. Wild, Social Origins and Ideology of Chiropractors, 22 Soc. Symp. 33 (1978)
quoted in Silver, supra note 162, at 350.
178. See text accompanying notes 90-108 supra.
179. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 273(a), 86 Stat. 1329
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395x(r) (1976)).
180. There are no scientific studies (if this is not a chiropractic paradox) confirming
"subluxation." See Silver, supra note 162, at 348.
181. See Silver, supra note 162.
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would be to upgrade the licensing requirements for the chiropractic profession so that the kind of medical paternalism embodied in
the 1972 Social Security amendments would be unnecessary.
D.

The New Health Professionals (NHPs)

Although the problems inherent in legitimization of chiropractic have existed for decades, entirely new problems regarding
hospital access and legitimization of health professionals have
arisen with the development of alternative forms of health care delivery during the 1970s. The creation and expansion of the new
health professionals' fields '8 2 resulted from the perceived loss of
person rapport between patients and physicians trained primarily
as technologists, the ballooning cost of hospital-oriented care, and
the short supply of physicians during the 1970s.' 8 3 The renewed
emphasis placed by medical schools upon care and patient rapport,
coupled with the predicted oversupply of physicians,'" mandates
reassessment of the role of the NHPs. To complicate the situation,
while the number of nonphysician autonomous health care providers has risen, essential supervised health care providers, such as
nurses, are in extremely short supply.
The new health professionals group consists primarily of nurse
practitioners, (NPs)-those persons generally educated as nurses,
but who, with further education, are qualified to perform independent medical acts in addition to those traditionally delegated to
nurses. The term includes nurse-midwives, nurse associates, and
nurse clinicians. Physicians' assistants (PAs) are recognized under
a PA statute as qualified to perform medical acts under the supervision of physicians.18 5 This section of the Note uses the nursemidwife as a paradigm for those new health professionals seeking
hospital staff privileges.1 86
The renewed demand for nurse-midwives arose with the women's movement of the 1970s and expressed itself as part of the
strong desire to take women's health care out of the hands of male physicians
and put the control and care of women's bodies back where it belongs-with
women. Therefore, this decade has seen an increased withdrawal by women
182. See Chapman & Record, Defensibility of New Health Professionalsat Law: A
Speculative Paper,4 J. HzA.TH POL., POL'Y & L. 30, 42-44 (1979).
183. See id. at 30-32; Yankauer, supra note 157.
184. See GMENAC SUMMARY RPORT, supra note 40.
185. Kissam, Physician'sAssistant and Nurse PractitionerLaws: A Study of Health
Law Reform, 24 U. KAN. L. Rav. 1, 1 n.4 (1975).
186. See Hearing,supra note 140 (investigation of denial of malpractice insurance to a
physician who provided back-up service for nurse midwives).
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from the traditional institutions of medicine,187including an increase in the desire for home birth attended by a midwife.

The justifications for the new health professionals in general 88 are
particularly applicable to nurse-midwives. In addition, midwives
generally offer a service in underserved geographical areas at a
lower cost. 189 Moreover, midwifery care traditionally has been offered outside the hospital, either in a "birthing center" or in the
home.
The growing pressure for hospital access is predicated on the
increasing need of the nurse-midwife, an innovative health professional, to achieve legitimization by admission to hospital privileges.
Ironically, the basis for this pressure has been "quality care," the
long-standing rallying cry of the physicians. Hospital-based midwifery service is also supposed to offer the patient a "choice"-one
which the patient will prefer. Both the quality of care and the patient choice arguments stem from the physician-reinforced assumption that only the hospital institution can deliver "essential"
medical care, but the low rate of maternal and infant mortality
associated
with
midwife-assisted
deliveries
belies
this
assumption. 190
The struggle over hospital access is understandable in light of
the economics of the obstetrical specialty. The declining American
birthrate means that the obstetrical pie will inevitably be sliced
more thinly. Thus, midwifery is an innovative service offered in a
declining market with predicted oversupply. 91 Because of this
market situation, the hospitals' denial of access inevitably sets the
stage for antitrust litigation against hospitals and competing obstetricians.19 2 Beyond antitrust theory and defense, however, the policy arguments for diversification of health care personnel, services,
and institutions makes even better economic sense.
Because the nurse-midwives seem to presage a new stage in
health care delivery-the advent of a viable alternative institution-it is distressing to witness the continual retreat toward that
bastion of the medical establishment, the hospital. Widespread acceptance of midwifery services provides the most successful oppor9 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 631, 632 (1978-1979) (citing S. ARMS, IMMACULATE DEA NEW LOOK AT WOMEN AND CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA 147 (1975)).
188. See text accompanying note 183 supra.
189. Midwives' clientele, however, is increasingly middle class, because of the women's
movement and the economic incentives.
190. The Tennessean, Nov. 23, 1980, at 17A, col. 1.
191. See GMENAC SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 40.
192. See generally Hearing, supra note 140.
187.
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tunity to educate consumers and encourage their patronage of alternative, lower-cost health care providers and institutions.
Unrestricted access to hospitals by nurse-midwives and other
new health professionals may be a short-sighted, emotionallybased overreaction to the stubborn and equally short-sighted opposition of the obstetrical establishment in particular and the hospital-based medical community in general. Given the extremely low
maternal and infant mortality rates in midwife-assisted births, the
argument in favor of hospital access based upon the "quality" of
hospital care seems specious, since the mortality rates for physician-assisted births in hospitals is higher.1 9 s Moreover, the present
quality of care in hospitals is dangerously low because of a widespread nursing shortage. To burden an already overladen system
with essentially "healthy" patients 19 4 when reasonable alternatives
exist is a foolish course of action-one not in the best interests of
the patient. Home or birth-center delivery is less expensive than
hospital delivery 9 5 and, for the healthy population that midwifery
serves, is a safer alternative.
In spite of the predicted oversupply of health providers, new
health professionals will still have many needs to fill. Most "underoffered" services 19 6 -nutrition counseling, behavior modification,
work with the terminally ill, maternal and infant services, and geriatric care-are presently offered almost exclusively within the hospital. All could be offered at an equal or higher level of quality-and at a lower cost-in other health care settings such as
nursing homes, expanded home-based care, outpatient clinics, new
health professionals' partnership groups, and birthing centers.
Furthermore, given the predicted oversupply of physicians and
the steadily increasing supply of new health practitioners, 97 the
existing hospital facilities will not be sufficient for the supply of
primary care personnel. The certificate of need program and the
push toward cost containment have discouraged the building of
new acute care hospitals for the primary purpose of accommodating providers. Again, less expensive alternative facilities and institutions seem to be a necessary component of future health care
193. See Hearing,supra note 140.
194. See Bowland v. Municipal Court, 18 Cal. 3d 479, 487, 556 P.2d 1081, 1084, 134
Cal. Rptr. 630, 633 (1976) (midwifery is not treatment of the "sick or afflicted").
195. In the United States it takes approximately 2.5 staff persons to care for one hospital patient. M. ROEMER, supra note 22, at 100.
196. See Chapman & Record, supra note 182, at 44-45.
197. See Yankauer, supra note 157, at 1049.
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services. Unless such alternatives are pursued, an even greater monopolistic concentration of health care power in the hospital institution could fuel yet another kind of antitrust action in the health
care field.
The noneconomic benefits offered by the new health professionals must also be taken into account. A new emphasis on care
would be a welcome complement to the emphasis on technological
innovation that has dominated the medical profession during the
last four decades. The attributes of caring and personal concern
commonly offered by the new health professionals are those
thought lost with the passing of the old, prescientific family doctor.
Under the competitive pressure of the new health professionals,
these attributes are once again beginning to percolate through the
medical system. The combination of old concerns and technology
promises a more satisfactory relationship between health providers
and patients.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Note has dealt in large part with the genesis and present
status of hospital access problems for physicians. The historical
development of both the hospital and the medical profession has
created an increasingly uneasy interdependence between the institution and the profession. In recent history access problems have
been forged, in the main, by the competing and often contradictory
demands of the medical profession itself, the government, and scientific technology.
The medical profession has laudably stressed the need for
quality care and individualized physician attention without regard
to cost. The executive and legislative branches of government have
proposed and implemented various programs designed to achieve
equality of access by all patients to that "quality" care offered by
physicians. In efforts to achieve that praiseworthy goal, the government has subsidized a plethora of new hospitals and programs such
as Medicare and Medicaid1'9 8 and has approved increases in the
base numbers and kinds of health professionals.1 99 Because the
government often did not consider long term cost at the time of
implementation, health care prices have increased, especially in the
198. Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42, 45 U.S.C.).
199. E.g., Health Professionals Education Assistance Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-484,
90 Stat. 2243 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 42 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. II
1978)).
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past fifteen years. The unchecked proliferation of medical technology over the past four decades has produced so many new developments that it can be constrained only by an increase in government
regulation, a decrease in the quality of care, or elimination of technological one-upsmanship of the professionals. The province of the
judiciary has been to balance and accommodate these and other
conflicting interests when disputes have arisen between physicians
and hospitals over questions of professional access.
In addition to examining these major forces currently shaping
the question of physicians' access, the Note has also posited one
large area of future conflict: the accommodation of the growing
number of health professionals other than physicians who desire
access to hospital privileges. The gradual acceptance of osteopaths
into the mainstream of modern American medicine and the present demands of chiropractors and nurse-midwives for hospital access have foreshadowed this conflict.
There is no doubt that the range of professional services offered by a health care provider and the income received by such a
provider are increased by expanded use of inpatient hospital facilities. Whether the maximal range of services is necessary for adequate health care is conjectural. Gains of extended staff privileges-primarily "legitimization" of all health care providers and
an extension of options offered to patients who want to choose hospital inpatient care for services traditionally offered in less expensive circumstances-may be offset by the increased costs and the
increased concentration of health care services in the hospital institution, but with the resultant danger of institutional
monopolization.
Despite these considerations the hospital will remain the primary health care institution in the 1980s, but it "will be the arena
for resolution of the tensions between [professional and] community and institutional needs. ' 20 0 McNerney's use of the word
"arena"-with its suggestion of conflict and trial by combat-is an
apt metaphor. The inpatient hospital facility will be the core institution of the 1980s, but its dominance will not go unchallenged.
The necessary adaptation of the health care system to meet the
needs of the consumer-patient, the challenge of cost containment,
and the expansion of health care providers (both in numbers and
in kind) will be accomplished by a variety of new approaches.
200.

McNerney, Control of Health-Care Costs in the 1980's, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED.

1088, 1094 (1980).
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Some of these will demand an adjustment by the medical profession. For example, the toleration, acceptance, and support by licensed physicians of diverse and autonomous health care professionals would be revolutionary,201 but would free physicians to
devote themselves to treatment of disease 202 rather than to maintenance of health. In like manner, a recognition by governmental icensing boards of the changing roles of the new health professionals would demand a restructuring and expansion of the licensed
scope of their expertise. This expansion would, it is hoped, offer
consumer-patients alternative and less expensive forms of health
care delivery. Cooperation between health professionals, government, and business should produce diverse health care delivery
systems that would challenge the monolithic hospital industry-for
example, health maintenance organizations,2 0 3 expanded and im-

proved nursing homes, 204 new health professional partnership

20 6
groups, 20 5 and broader, innovative prepayment insurance plans.

Such diversity would allow professional providers to "earn a [living] wage and make less use of the hospital's inpatient facilities,

207

with resultant benefit to consumer-patients and to the

economy.
It is important to note that the success of a diversified health
care industry depends in large measure upon the attitude and acceptance of the consumer-patient. As the emphasis on fitness and
health maintenance proliferates, there is a growing recognition that
the patient himself is the physician's primary competitor;208 the
patient's health depends on his own initiative rather than upon
201. See Connelly & Connelly, Physicians' PatientReferrals to a Nurse Practitioner
in a Primary Care Medical Clinic, 69 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 73 (1979) (physicians' attitudes

toward nurse practitioners generally favorable, but referrals to the nurse practitioners fewer
than expected).
202. See Oppenheim, Healers,303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1117 (1980).
203. For a discussion of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), see McNeil &
Schlenker, HMOs, Competition, and Government, 53 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 195
(1975).
204. See Butler, Assuring the Quality of Care and Life in Nursing Homes: The Dilemma of Enforcement, 57 N.C. L. REv. 1317 (1979).
205. See Chapman & Record, supra note 182, at 42-44. (discussion of potential tort
liabilities for NHPs in various hypothetical working arrangements).
206. See generally A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN (1980). For discussions of Enthoven's
Consumer-Choice Health Plan (CCHP), see Ginzberg, Competition and Cost Containment,
303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1112 (1980); Neuhauser, Enthoven's "Health Plan",303 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1115 (1980).
207. McNerney, supra note 200, at 1094.
208. See, e.g., Thorne, Patient Self-Care: May Improve Care, Cut Costs, 14 INTERNAL
MEDIcINE NEWS & CARDIOLOGY NEWS 3 (1981).
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that of the physician. It is to a great extent the legal profession's
role to maintain order and perspective within this new diversity.
Although antitrust law is a possible cure for the ills of the health
care industry, 0 9 its limitations vis-d-vis diversity should be recognized, especially in hospital cases. Avoidance of hospital monopoly
power is as desirable as avoidance of physician monopoly power.
More positively, the development of varying standards of care for
the emerging health institutions2 10 and professionals 211 is a matter
of first importance for the legal profession. For example, standards
for physicians have not been applied to chiropractors21 2 or nurses
and should not be applied in the future as autonomous professionals compete with physicians. Such salutary competition, from the
health policy perspective, promises that as institutional and professional diversity develops, the physician may, with the tables
turned, sue for access into nonhospital health care institutions
from which he has been excluded.
JANE
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209. See articles cited in note 139 supra.
210. See, e.g., Hackler, Expansion of Health Care Providers' Liability: An Application of Darling to Long-Term Health Care Facilities,9 CONN. L. REV. 462 (1977).
211. See, e.g., Chapman & Record, supra note 182.
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